Politics, Error-Correction and Cognitive Backfire

Here's a report on some of that research that seems to show that, if you correct people's political misconceptions, it often strengthens their false beliefs.

I haven't read the actual paper yet, and there are reasons to be skeptical. As another researcher points out, if you really hit people between the eyes with the facts, you can eliminate the backfire effect. (That's something we already knew, actually, from our ordinary experience.) I'd also note that, in Nyhan's research, what was tested was one story and one retraction. The effect will almost certainly decrease if you look at several encounters with disconfirming reports.

Interestingly, apparently people who feel better about themselves are more open to evidence that disconfirms their beliefs. This is an effect I've seen in myself. If I'm feeling good, getting lots of stuff right, on my game, and in a situation where my status is high, I'm much happier about admitting ignorance and error. In situations in which my status is lower, it's tougher.

Anyway, one solution to some of these problems comes to us from C. S. Peirce--don't lean so heavily on belief. Often--in science and in policy debates--hypotheses and tentative, working positions are superior to belief. The less ardently we're attached to a proposition, the lower the cognitive cost of abandoning it. Belief, Peirce says, is out of place in science.