Jones's Decision in the Dover Evolution Trial
Well, I'm not actually thrilled about it. I haven't read the actual opinion yet, but if the reports are to be believed, what we seem to have here is some fairly weak arguments in support of a correct conclusion. But we can't accept weak reasoning just because it gives us the conclusion we prefer.
For one thing, Jones seems to be taking a position on the dispute about the so-called "demarcation criterion," something most philosophers of science seemed to give up on some time ago. The demarcation criterion is supposed to be the criterion that distinguishes science from non-science. Popper's, to take a well-known example, was falsifiability: a theory was scientific if falsifiable, otherwise not. Unfortunately that criterion doesn't seem to work for some fairly well-known reasons. But those details aren't to the point in this post. Judge Jones seems to suggest, according to the reports, that one definitive difference between science and non- or pseudo-science is that scientific theories are necessarily naturalistic. This is a relatively common thing to say, but it seems to be false.
Remember one of our recent Philosoraptor polls in which I asked whether one could scientifically investigate supernatural phenomena? I asked that because of a discussion I was having with Mark over at Braving the Elements. I think that Mark is inclined to think that Creationism/IDT is clearly non-science, whereas I am not sure that there's a clear distinction between bad science and non-science. One way to look at it is like so: theories and theorizers just get worse and worse until they are so distant from good science that they no longer need to be taken seriously--but there's no clear, bright line between science and non- or pseudo-science. At any rate, almost everyone who responded thought that we could scientifically investigate non- or super-natural phenomena; that means that most who answered should be inclied to reject Judge Jones's proposed criterion.
The Post story also suggests that Jones argues that IDT is non-science because it is an argument from design, and Aquinas used an argument from design as well. Reconstruct that argument if you dare; it's very weak at best.
At any rate, most of us have a tendency to lose our heads in politics and accept any argument that supports a conclusion we favor. That's intellectually dishonest. Though that alone should be enough to persuade you, here's another reason: if you accept bad arguments they can come back to bite you later in unexpected ways.
A footnote in case you're interested: I'm currently most interested in Peirce's demarcation criterion. As I read him, he thinks that inquiry is a fundamentally moral enterprise, and what distinguishes the scientist from the non-scientists is intentional: the former want to know the truth, whatever it might be, while the latter have other motives. IDT folks aren't real scientists on that way of carving things up b/c they have set out to prove a conclusion they already (and dogmatically) believe. But most "scientists" aren't scientists either. If they are doing it for the money, or trying to prove a pet theory or to disprove some other theory because their rival supports it...or engaging in inquiry for any reason other than wanting to know the truth, then they aren't real scientists, no matter how technically adept they may be.
On the other hand I haven't really slept in a couple of weeks, so that may be incoherent. My rendering of it, that is, not Peirce's idea.
Of course that criterion won't be accepted any time soon.
Well, I'm not actually thrilled about it. I haven't read the actual opinion yet, but if the reports are to be believed, what we seem to have here is some fairly weak arguments in support of a correct conclusion. But we can't accept weak reasoning just because it gives us the conclusion we prefer.
For one thing, Jones seems to be taking a position on the dispute about the so-called "demarcation criterion," something most philosophers of science seemed to give up on some time ago. The demarcation criterion is supposed to be the criterion that distinguishes science from non-science. Popper's, to take a well-known example, was falsifiability: a theory was scientific if falsifiable, otherwise not. Unfortunately that criterion doesn't seem to work for some fairly well-known reasons. But those details aren't to the point in this post. Judge Jones seems to suggest, according to the reports, that one definitive difference between science and non- or pseudo-science is that scientific theories are necessarily naturalistic. This is a relatively common thing to say, but it seems to be false.
Remember one of our recent Philosoraptor polls in which I asked whether one could scientifically investigate supernatural phenomena? I asked that because of a discussion I was having with Mark over at Braving the Elements. I think that Mark is inclined to think that Creationism/IDT is clearly non-science, whereas I am not sure that there's a clear distinction between bad science and non-science. One way to look at it is like so: theories and theorizers just get worse and worse until they are so distant from good science that they no longer need to be taken seriously--but there's no clear, bright line between science and non- or pseudo-science. At any rate, almost everyone who responded thought that we could scientifically investigate non- or super-natural phenomena; that means that most who answered should be inclied to reject Judge Jones's proposed criterion.
The Post story also suggests that Jones argues that IDT is non-science because it is an argument from design, and Aquinas used an argument from design as well. Reconstruct that argument if you dare; it's very weak at best.
At any rate, most of us have a tendency to lose our heads in politics and accept any argument that supports a conclusion we favor. That's intellectually dishonest. Though that alone should be enough to persuade you, here's another reason: if you accept bad arguments they can come back to bite you later in unexpected ways.
A footnote in case you're interested: I'm currently most interested in Peirce's demarcation criterion. As I read him, he thinks that inquiry is a fundamentally moral enterprise, and what distinguishes the scientist from the non-scientists is intentional: the former want to know the truth, whatever it might be, while the latter have other motives. IDT folks aren't real scientists on that way of carving things up b/c they have set out to prove a conclusion they already (and dogmatically) believe. But most "scientists" aren't scientists either. If they are doing it for the money, or trying to prove a pet theory or to disprove some other theory because their rival supports it...or engaging in inquiry for any reason other than wanting to know the truth, then they aren't real scientists, no matter how technically adept they may be.
On the other hand I haven't really slept in a couple of weeks, so that may be incoherent. My rendering of it, that is, not Peirce's idea.
Of course that criterion won't be accepted any time soon.
posted by Winston Smith at
8:33 AM
5 Comments:
I agree with his decision, based on the idea that things that rely on the supernatural shouldn't be taught as science. Most science teachers already say "We don't know how the cell originated; no experiment has been able to replicate that bad-ass act of abiogenesis." They don't need to also say "Some theorists postulate that it was done by magic, by an unknown superpowerful being."
From a legal standpoint, the relevant demarcation issue is not whether ID is science, but rather whether ID is religion. On that issue, Judge Jones' reasoning fares rather well.
If a person's only motivation for testing hypotheses through carefully designed experimental protocol and submitting results to peers for critical review is to earn personal prestige, but a necessary and inevitable side effect is an increase in knowledge, then the person is doing science, even if she is not, by Pierce's demarcation criterion, a scientist.
Jones spent lots and lots of pages demonstrating that ID is specifically Christian. It seemed to me that this was the basis of his decision.
If ID is, according to an objective observer, a nonsectarian scientific theory, then it is permissible in the classroom; if not, then not. And he amply demonstrated that ID is a) derived from Christian theology; and b) advocated by Christians for c) the purpose of advancing Christianity. This is why he struck it down.
The lack of falsifiability was also noted, but it did not seem to me to be the crux of his argument. The lack of religious neutrality was the crux, and rightfully so.
Demarcation criterion? Please.
Define science however you like -- the point is that the ID people are not doing it.
Instead of creating experiments to test their hypotheses, performing actual research, or writing articles for respected science journals, they are trying to wedge their "theory" directly into the high school curriculum WITHOUT first getting it accepted by the scientific community.
Whatever demarcation criterion you philosophers manage to come up with, doing actual research should wind up on one side, and encrypting Christianity to sneak it into public schools should wind up on the other.
Ever notice how snotty and irrational people get when you try to discuss this subject dispassionately?
Post a Comment
Subscribe to Post Comments [Atom]
<< Home