Al Qaeda (Not) In Iraq
Or not very much, anyway, as Jason Linkins points out--but the administration keeps emphasizing them. They're just a small part of a motley group of insurgents who rose up against American forces...but it's politically expedient for the administration to exaggerate AQI's role.
Or not very much, anyway, as Jason Linkins points out--but the administration keeps emphasizing them. They're just a small part of a motley group of insurgents who rose up against American forces...but it's politically expedient for the administration to exaggerate AQI's role.
posted by Winston Smith at
8:32 AM
8 Comments:
Actually the answer is in Linkins' post, but is glossed over.
Even if al-Qaeda is only 3-5% of the insurgency, Gen Petraeus notes that their tactic has been to set Shia against Sunni. Indeed, they were likely behind the bombing of the Golden Mosque, and shortly thereafter, the fit hit the shan for intersectarian violence.
Regardless of their shrinking numbers [although the shrinking is a very good sign of strategic progress],
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htatrit/articles/20080323.aspx
it's al-Qaeda, and to a lesser but real degree al-Sadr, which can tip the current hairy balance.
Because in the end, WS, it's not always about words and spin. Sometimes there are actual facts on the ground behind all the jawing, charging, and countercharging. But lately, politics has become its own end.
Typically, Tom, nothing you say here refutes the claims in question. As usual, you try to distract by substituting a different claim for the one at issue.
Keep on nattering, though. I know that it's a necessary truth that your side is always right, and that evidence MUST by God eventually arise to prove this...if you can...just...keep...typing...long enough...
There are, of course, facts, and they're hard things, as we in the reality-based community have long known. Too bad your side didn't care about the facts when they started all this, eh?
"We in the reality-based community."
Man, you don't know how creepy that sounds.
I still don't know why you reply if you're not going to offer any substance, and then complain I waste your time. To try to bury my substantive points, is my only explanation.
All the RBC does is natter on about al-Qaeda, ignoring the rest of the terrorism picture. You want al-Qaeda? Fine, we got al-Qaeda.
Here's another Patterico post on the RBC's lies about Bush's "lies." Please ignore it, as you did the first one.
Tom --
before getting lost in the weeds again, let me pose a simple question: what amount of expense, both direct and in opportunity cost would it take for the Iraq war not to be worth it? We've already paid a very high price indeed.
Don't even try, A. It's a lost cause.
Tom --
before getting lost in the weeds again, let me pose a simple question: what amount of expense, both direct and in opportunity cost would it take for the Iraq war not to be worth it? We've already paid a very high price indeed.
# posted by Anonymous Anonymous : 9:12 PM
Don't even try, A. It's a lost cause.
# posted by Blogger Winston Smith : 9:54 PM
Actually, it's a fine question, WS, and I don't just say that because you've been dumping on me lately. [This must be the Good Anonymous, not the evil one.]
My quick answer is, I don't know. To look back and say it wasn't worth it [and I've read the Stiglitz that says it'll be $3 trillion before it's all over, although I could argue against the figure] is quite a defensible position for any number of reasons.
Even if it's under a trillion, that's still a lot of dough, and there are still 4000 US troop deaths, Iraqi deaths, loss of "prestige" and "moral capital," etc., etc.
But to have a true discussion---inquiry---one would also have to ask what Iraq and the world situation might be like if Saddam had simply been left in place.
I do not detect an environment here, or anywhere in the US polity really, where whether the glass is half-full or half-empty [or 60-40, or 90-10] could be explored without partisan rancor.
And so, I've tried to mostly back off on it [and so has the Bush administration, intentionally---I'll dig up a link if you're sincerely interested]. There's no percentage in holding the discussion. It's 2008, we're there, and what shall we do now?
McCain is plain on it; Obama indicated on 60 Minutes [and several of his advisers have likewise nodded and winked] that he'll make a prudent, not ideological decision; and HRC, whom I have trusted to be likewise prudent, seems to be running on "ending" the Iraq war on my TV today.
One might argue---and I suppose I would---that you make the best call you can at the time, that national security and our global interest can't be put into dollars and cents. Whatever the price is, you pay it. What did it cost to defeat Hitler and the Japanese Empire, or the Soviets? Who cares? Beancounters never won or preserved anyone's freedom. They sit on the sidelines, calculating the cost of history, but only after it's already been written.
On the other hand, maybe we just overreacted to 9-11 and the prospect of global jihad. Could be it was a paper tiger. Hard to tell. Could be.
The problem, of course, is that it isn't hard to tell, it wasn't a close call. To suggest that there is any reasonable analogy to WWII is just astonishing. One hardly knows how to respond.
And any even reasonably careful look at the facts shows that the administration wasn't reacting against what it honestly believed to be an "existential threat." As Woodward notes, what happened was that Wolfowitz decided that big thinking was needed after 9/11, and that government was incapable of doing it. So he went to AEI. They gave him a multi-year plan for re-making the Middle East. It involved invading *somebody*...but the other alternatives were infeasible (Iran was too strong, Egypt was out, etc.). But Iraq was available. And so that's what we did.
The very fact that Cheney had to set up his own policy shop to spin the data until it looked sorta like he wanted it to, and the fact that the administration semi-openly talked about selling the war, and rolling it out as a new "product" is telling here.
There are close calls and difficult choices. But this really wasn't one. If we're going to understand our mistake and help to guarantee that it doesn't happen again, we have to look at the facts, and look at them relatively dispassionately. There's a political motive to try to make the decisions look reasonable, but it simply wasn't. There were, of course, SOME reasons for invading Iraq, but the mere existence of some reasons does not necessarily make the decision a close call. If we count things like this as a close call, then virtually every decision will be a close call. And if we do that, then virtually any decision can count as justified.
The thing to keep in mind is that it is almost ALWAYS possible, with enough nipping and tucking and selectivity, to make any course of action look as if it were in the ballpark. That's why objectivity is so crucial in politics and policy...and also why they are both such a damn mess.
Well, we only can be sure of the negative side of the ledger: the cost.
How much better---if at all---Iraq is or will be than leaving Saddam in place is unknown, and those who have already made up their minds decline to make the inquiry.
That's the direct answer to Good Anonymous' question, not the same old rehash of the runup to war.
Which is why, GA, there is no percentage in the discussion.
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